Various studies have attempted to determine the effect of mergers and acquisitions on efficiency, and most have used data at the level of the individual firm to examine the effects on such variables as stock prices, profits, and market share.2 Our methodological approach differs in two important respects: the level of aggregation of the data and our metric of efficiency. We investigate the determinants and effects of ownership change at the level of the individual plant by examining the behavior of total factor productivity. This research design offers two significant advantages. First, the data allow us to examine the effects of certain transactions that have not been observed before. Because many ownership changes involve only parts of companies or even parts of divisions of companies, it is very difficult to assess the impact of such partial acqusitions and divestitures using financial data at the level of the company or even of the line of business. Second, there is a consensus that the best way to measure the efficiency of an enterprise (or of an economic system) is to measure its total factor productivity. This paper analyzes the relationship between total factor productivity and ownership change, using Census Bureau data on more than 18,000 relatively large plants throughout the U.S. manufacturing sector. About 21 percent of the plants changed owners at least once during a ten-year period. The data enable us to compare, both before and after ownership change, the productivity of these plants with that of plants in the same industry that have not changed owners.
desirable depends to an important extent on whether ownership change increases or decreases efficiency.
Various studies have attempted to determine the effect of mergers and acquisitions on efficiency, and most have used data at the level of the individual firm to examine the effects on such variables as stock prices, profits, and market share.2 Our methodological approach differs in two important respects: the level of aggregation of the data and our metric of efficiency. We investigate the determinants and effects of ownership change at the level of the individual plant by examining the In contrast, Dennis C. Mueller contended that corporate leaders pursue a policy of growth rather than maximization of profit or stockholder wealth.7 Executive compensation is often based on revenue increases, and because of imperfections in capital markets, large firms are less likely to be taken over. Consistent with this notion of management empire building, Richard Roll argued that the net effect of mergers is to reduce stockholder wealth because acquiring firms systematically overestimate the value of their targets. He attributed this myopic behavior to the hubris of top-level executives.8 Michael Gort's theory of economic disturbance implied that mergers have a neutral effect on efficiency. His model treated assets transferred through ownership change in the same manner as other income-producing assets. Mergers, he argued, are caused mainly by divergent expectations: the acquiring and acquired firms have vastly different perceptions of the present value of the target company's stock, based on different expectations about future levels and sources of income. These discrepancies, he added, are more likely to occur during periods of economic disturbance-bull markets or rapid technological change.9
These theories, of course, do not constitute a complete summary of merger motives. Other reasons for takeovers frequently cited include the drive for monopoly power and the desire to achieve tax savings. '?
A "Matching" Theory of Ownership Change
We believe ownership change is primarily a mechanism for correcting lapses of efficiency. Most acquisitions are precipitated by a deterioration in the target firm's economic peiformance. Deteriorating productivity provides an important signal to a plant's owner that for some reason he is operating in a less efficient manner than an alternative parent could. This may be due to an inherent incompatibility between plant and owner (a comparative disadvantage) or an overall lack of managerial competence (an absolute disadvantage).
To account for the sources of incompatibility between plant and parent company, we note the striking similarity between their relationship and the one between workers and employers. In the job separation model advanced by Boyan Jovanovic, the employee's true productivity in a given firm is unknown before he or she is hired. The employer's knowledge of the worker's ability improves as job tenure increases. Heterogeneous groups of workers and employers thus continually engage in a matching process, and experience provides important new information concerning the quality of the match. 1I1 We believe that the theory of ownership change or plant turnover is closely related to the matching theory of job turnover. Before acquiring or building a plant, corporations (especially well-diversified ones) have incomplete information about the true levels of efficiency of these heterogeneous plants. The companies are interested only in maintaining control of establishments they can manage effectively. In this sense, firms are constantly evaluating the match or fit between plant and parent. More precise information about the quality of the match develops the longer a firm operates a plant.
The matching theory of plant turnover entails three primary assumptions.
-Some owners enjoy a comparative advantage with respect to certain plants. The source of a firm's comparative advantage may be a combination of its managerial expertise, technological skill, and ability to exploit opportunities for economies of scale or scope.
-The quality of the match is the major determinant of the corporate-Frank R. Lichtenberg and Donald Siegel 649 level decision to maintain or relinquish ownership of an establishment. In this regard, we need not assume that there are good owners and bad owners or plants but only that there are good and bad matches. 12 -The quality of the match is indexed by total factor productivity, our measure of efficiency, which is a good whose quality is determined by experience. Owners cannot determine the efficiency of plants in advance. The nature of their comparative advantage becomes evident only as they operate the facilities.
The following illustration describes the matching process. Plants and their owners are matched initially at time 0. Match quality, and hence productivity, varies randomly. The lower the plant productivity is, relative to the mean level of efficiency in the industry, the higher the probability of ownership change. Because of transactions costs associated with selling a plant, there is a threshold below which the relative efficiency of the plant must fall before a change in ownership is sensible. When an ownership change does occur, even an average match leads to above-average growth in productivity or an increase in efficiency.
The matching theory of plant turnover has two major implications.
-A low level of productivity, which indicates a poor match, will induce a change in ownership.
-A change in ownership will result in an increase in productivity. The quality of each match, which is measured by the level of plant productivity, is assumed to be randomly distributed. 13 Thus the expected value of a new match (from an identical distribution) is higher, given that the first match was low.
Data
Our analysis of the determinants and effects of changes in plant ownership is based on the Longitudinal Establishment Data (LED) file. This file, which brings together data from the Annual Survey and Census of Manufactures collected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, is used to 12. This implies that firms with an absolute disadvantage are sold because they will have all bad matches.
13. In practice, of course, the quality of the match may be somewhat predictable. We abstract from this by focusing on the unpredictable component of the variation in match quality. mneasure productivity at the plant level. The file is the richest source of annual data collected from manufacturing establishments, containing detailed information on output and inputs.
We analyze a balanced extract of the full LED file, called the LED Time Series file. In this data set, 20,493 manufacturing plants owned by more than 5,700 firms were observed annually from 1972 to 1981. A Census Bureau coverage code was provided in all years, allowing changes in corporate ownership to be identified. Each plant was also assigned a four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code based on its primary product and a code identifying the ultimate corporate owner. Table 2 The difference between the LED file and its time series extract is due to plant failures and changes in the ASM sample, which was redrawn in 1974 and again in 1979. The unique cross-section and time-series aspects of these establishments with respect to the population of manufacturing plants will be examined in detail below. Given the nonrandom distribution of the plants we observed, the ownership changes involving them are nonrepresentative. This issue will also be addressed.
The cross-section in the sample consists mainly of large plants, which is not surprising because the LED documentation explains that large plants owned by larger-than-average firms are disproportionately represented in the file. Table 2 shows that LED Time Series plants, although comparatively few, are ten or twelve times as large in terms of employment and output, respectively, as the typical manufacturing plant. where Q is output, K is stock of physical capital, L is labor input, M is intermediate materials input (including energy), and the subscript i refers to plant i. The construction of the Q, K, L, and M measures is described in the appendix; u is a classical disturbance term. Separate estimation of the equation for individual industries and years allowed the elasticities, cvi, to vary across industries and over time. We did not impose the assumptions of competitive factor markets or constant returns to scale. The residual measures the logarithmic deviation of a plant's total factor productivity from the average productivity of plants in its industry.
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
To investigate the effects of ownership change on efficiency at the plant level, we examined the behavior of total factor productivity growth. Standard growth accounting methods using the full equilibrium index model were used to calculate TFP growth. 19 Production was assumed to be characterized by a three-factor production function:
Q(t) = A(t)F[K(t), L(t), M(t)],
where Q, K, L, and M are as previously defined, and A is a Hicks-neutral measure of technical change.
For simplicity, we assumed a Cobb-Douglas production function: In principle other variables, such as unionization or the extent of certain types of fixed investment, may influence the probability of ownership change, so it is desirable to include additional covariates. David J. Ravenscraft and F. M. Scherer considered many possible determinants of divisional (line-of-business) divestiture, including profitability of the firm, strategic variables (line-of-business market share, research and development costs, and advertising costs), and various dummy variables relating to previous merger activity within each line of business. Such explanatory variables are excluded from our ownership change equation because they were unobserved or because calculating them was not feasible. But Ravenscraft and Scherer concluded that profitability or performance of the line of business is the most important determinant of selling off a line of business.22 Similarly, we find that productivity plays a major role in plant divestiture. Furthermore, unless the omitted variables are correlated with the regressors in the probit equation, our estimate of the impact of productivity on the decision to sell is unbiased.
where Xl(t) equals K(t), X2(t) equals L(t), X3(t) equals M(t), and Pi
Although we believe that low productivity leads to ownership change, another, perhaps more illuminating, way to examine this relationship is to compute the mean values of RELTFP73 by values of OC7480 (that is, separately for plants that change ownership and those that do not) and to test the hypothesis that the means are equal. Abram Bergson used a of the timing effects of ownership change, we computed productivity residuals based on Cobb-Douglas production functions, estimated separately by industry, using annual data for 1973-80. These residuals were used to calculate differences in mean levels of productivity in year t + i (i = 7, -6,... , 6, 7) between plants changing owners in year t and plants remaining with the same corporation.26 The pooled, withinindustry ordinary least squares estimates of these differences are presented in table 5. Consider the value -3.7 in year t-1. This number indicates that plants changing owners in year t were 3.7 percent less productive in year t -1 than plants in the same industry not changing owners in year t. The relative performance of changers in year t was poorest at the end of the transition year, the year of ownership change (-3.9 percent). Successive declines in the absolute values of the differences indicate that relative levels of efficiency improve after ownership changes.
26. The differences are estimates of the parameter 3 in the following regression model:
Residual+,i = ai + fiOC, (i = -7, -6,...,6, 7), where OC, equals 1 if the plant changed owners between t -1 and t and 0 otherwise, and the residuals are computed from withinindustry production functions.
The other major implication of the matching theory is that plant turnover should result in improvements in productivity. The values presented in table 5 suggest that productivity growth is higher after plants have been involved in takeovers. Just four years after ownership has changed, approximately 49 percent of the productivity gap that existed at t -1 (-3.7 percent) between year t changers and nonchangers was closed (-1.9 percent). At t + 7, almost 68 percent of this gap was eliminated (-1.2 percent). Moreover, the difference in t + 7 is not statistically significant. Thus we cannot reject the hypothesis that plants that were sold seven years before are just as productive as plants that were not sold.
To examine further the effects of plant turnover on economic efficiency, we computed regressions of the growth in TFP between 1974 and 1980 on various measures of the incidence of ownership change in those years. These results are reported in table 6, which supports the hypothesis that ownership change improves productivity. Plants involved in one or more transactions during this period experienced 0.58 percent higher TFP growth than their industry counterparts who remained with the same parent corporation.
If the new owners of plants increase the economic efficiency of these establishments, it seems likely that several years must elapse before this improvement is measurable. To test this assumption, we classified ownership changes according to whether they occurred early (1974-76) or late (1977-80) in the period. Plants changing hands early had significant improvements in efficiency; those changing toward the end of the period did not. Thus it appears that efficiency gains associated with ownership changes do not occur immediately. Productivity increases were slightly greater in plants that experienced more than one ownership change during the period. Each plant's initial productivity is included in table 6 as an additional regressor to control for the possibility of a regression toward the mean. As discussed previously, the increases in productivity that seem to be associated with a change in ownership may in fact reflect the tendency of below-or above-average values to regress toward mean values.
Plants that changed owners thus had lower initial levels of productivity and greater growth in productivity than plants that did not. Consistent with a matching hypothesis of plant turnover, we interpret the low initial level to be due to inefficient management (perhaps because of random mismatch) and the higher growth to be due on average to more efficient where a equals 1 + 3. The hypothesis is that P < 0, or that a < 1. Plants beneath the frontier have opportunities to catch up that are unavailable to "best practice" plants near the frontier; that is, maybe all plants that exhibit substandard levels of performance at the beginning of a period catch up, with or without changing owners. The second potential explanation makes a weaker assumption about the evolution of TFP, but is based on the fact that plants that close were not included in our sample. Suppose TFP follows a random walk, that is, TFP -TFP_ I + E, so that (in the notation of the previous paragraph) a = 1. Also assume that if a plant's relative productivity declines below a certain threshold, it will close. Consider the plants that experience a given decline in productivity from one year to the next. The higher its initial productivity, the less likely the plant is to cross the threshold and therefore to close. Plants with low initial levels of productivity are more likely to be absent from the sample than plants with high initial levels. Even if productivity follows a random walk, censoring could account for the fact that plants with low initial productivity levels have higher average productivity growth. Regression toward the mean could account for this fact even in the absence of censoring.
Neither of these mechanisms, however, could account for the entire set of coefficients presented in table 5. In particular, they cannot explain why the relative productivity of plants that change owners does not rise-and indeed falls-between t -7 and t, and rises only after t. Both the explanations sketched above would predict that relative productivity would increase beginning in t -7. The fact that productivity begins to rise only after the ownership change occurs strongly suggests that it is the change in ownership that is largely responsible for the improvement. When initial productivity is included in the regression model, the estimated coefficients decline, but only slightly. Thus even after controlling for a possible regression-to-the-mean effect, we still found that ownership change led to improvements in economic efficiency.
Finally, initial productivity may also have been mismeasured, perhaps because of errors in the industry deflators used to calculate constant dollar values of output, capital, materials, and energy. Measurement error is also associated with the calculation of levels of TFP. However, in constructing estimates of TFP growth, we assumed that this measurement error was permanent.27 Thus the true model we attempt to estimate in column 4 of table 6 is of the form y = 3IX, + 32X2 + ti, where y is TFP growth, XI is an ownership change dummy variable (subsequent), X2 is "true" initial productivity, and u is a classical disturbance term. We do not observe X2, but rather an imperfect measure of initial productivity, Z2 = X2 + E, where E is a classical disturbance term. In addition, E (measurement error) is assumed to be uncorrelated with u, XI, and y. Zvi Griliches demonstrated that in the case of a regression model with two independent variables where only one is subject to measurement error, the bias in the point estimate of the variable that is measured incorrectly is transmitted to the other coefficient. He derived the following formula for the bias in PI: plim(@P -PI) = -p (bias P2), where p is the correlation coefficient between XI and Z2. 28 We have already presented evidence suggesting that an inverse relationship exists between initial productivity and subsequent ownership change (p < 0). Furthermore, it is well known that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of 12 is biased toward zero.29 Thus the bias in 32 iS transmitted to 1I, and we expect the OLS estimate of PI also to be biased toward zero. An instrumental variables (IV) estimator was used to adjust for the bias inherent in OLS estimation of the models in columns 4, 5, and 6 of table 6. We experimented with many possible instruments for initial productivity, settling on productivity in 1973 (t -7) as the best instrument. As expected, the point estimates of the ownership-change The data are, then, consistent with the two key implications of the matching theory of ownership change-that the least productive plants are most likely to change owners and that ownership change tends to be associated with above-average increases in productivity. Computing differences in mean growth rates of outputs, inputs, and productivity in year t+ i (i = -7, -6, . . ., 6, 7) between plants changing owners in year t and plants not changing owners in year t provides additional insight into this phenomnenon. As before, all data are standardized by four-digit SIC industry, so these differences should be interpreted as pooled, within-industry differences .30 The differences and the associated t-statistics (for testing Ho: difference = 0) are presented in table 7. To clarify the interpretation of these nuumbers, consider the value -1.1 in the fifth row (i = -3) under "output." This value signifies that the mean rate of output growth in year t-3 of firms that changed owners in year t was 1.1 percent lower than the corresponding mean output growth rate of year t nonchangers. In the "output" column the difference in growth rates is negative and generally increasing in magnitude from t -4 through t, the year of ownership change, and is positive in years t + 1 and t + 3. All these differences are statistically significant. The mean growth rate of output of year t changers was lower in every year before t except t -5 and t -7 (the average between t -3 and t -1 was -1.8 percent), and higher in every year between t + 1 and t + 3 (the average difference during this period was 1.4 percent). These differences show that change in ownership arrests and to some extent reverses the decline of a plant. Because the differences in output growth rates after ownership change are smaller than the differences before acquisition, the year t changers experienced a shrinking market share between years t -3 and t + 3.
Consider next the differences in labor input growth rates. With one 30. The differences are the parameter estimates of 3 derived from regressions of the following form: In (X?, j/X,,i l) = oxi + iOC, (i = -7, -6, . . ., 6, 7). where OC, equals 1 if the plant changed owners between t -1 and t and 0 otherwise. X refers to the specific variables considered in table 7. All of these growth rates were standardized by industry. important exception, the pattern is similar to the case of output: from t-3 through t, the differences are negative and growing. Labor input begins to be higher for year t changers in t + 1, although the increases are smaller than they were for output growth. Still, the absence of lower growth rates after ownership changes is inconsistent with the view that new owners seek significant reductions in employment. Shleifer and Summers suggest that a firm's long-term implicit contracts with workers and suppliers are breached in the course of a hostile takeover. Our analysis indicates that changes in ownership are more likely to stem employment reductions than trigger mass layoffs.3" The statistics for materials tell a similar story: dramatically slower growth in materials used and in capital before and during the ownership change, slightly higher growth afterward. The differences in annual total factor productivity growth rates are inconsistent with the results reported earlier and with input and outputs. Plants that were sold had significantly higher TFP growth in years t -1 through t + 1. We believe these results are implausible, because TFP growth is calculated as output growth minus a Divisia index of input growth, using plant-specific factor shares as weights. Short-term fluctuations in plant activities are such that factor shares and thus TFP growth rates are computed imprecisely.
Conclusions
Twenty-one percent of the plants in the sample, which are larger than average manufacturing establishments, experienced at least one change in corporate control between 1972 and 1981. Evidence pertaining to the determinants and effects of these transfers is consistent with the empirical implications of a matching theory of plant turnover. That is, a firm lacking a comparative advantage with respect to a given plant will sell it to another corporation, leading on average to an improvement in the plant's economic performance.
Our analysis of the factors influencing divestitures of plants found that low levels of efficiency increase the likelihood of ownership change. A probit regression of subsequent turnover on initial productivity and size revealed that industry laggards in 1973 were more likely to be sold in the following six years than plants that were efficient. The suitability of matches between plants and firms thus seems rationally evaluated by their owners. Low levels of productivity indicate that a plant and its owner are not suited for each other, and a termination of this relationship is imminent.
Shleifer and Summers, "Hostile Takeovers as Breaches of Trust." The abrogation of implicit contracts need not involve layoffs; work rules and other nonpecuniary aspects of labor relations may change instead.
In the previous section, we presented prima facie evidence of improvement in the efficiency of manufacturing plants after changes in corporate ownership. In our framework, efficiency gains were defined as higher rates of TFP growth, or larger shifts in the production frontiers of establishments changing owners. Plants involved in ownership changes experienced, on average, 0.5 percent higher TFP growth between 1974 and 1980, a result driven by the 0.8 percent increase realized by plants changing hands during the first three years in the six-year period. Apparently, it takes several years for a new parent to have a significant influence on performance.
Results concerning differences in levels of productivity between sold and unsold plants (table 5) provide the most powerful evidence supporting the hypothesis of increased efficiency. Sold plants exhibit both lower initial levels of productivity and a deterioration in relative performance through the year in which these acquisitions occur. But after changing owners, their improvement in performance reduces and eventually (after seven years) almost eliminates the productivity gap that existed between them and the control group before takeover. Truncation or censoring caused by our failure to observe plants that close cannot explain these patterns of relative performance, but it would be desirable to confirm this claim by analyzing uncensored data. This is a task for future conglomerate mergers and acquisitions. In a subsequent paper they observed that heightened merger activity in the 1960s led to massive divestitures in the 1970s, divestitures that were precipitated by steadily deteriorating profits.34 Observing 282 lines of business before and after divestiture (line-of-business data are available for 1974-77), they concluded that these units earned higher profits after joining new corporations but that performance did not improve enough to allow them to earn normal rates of return. The results of that paper are generally consistent with our findings. However, Ravenscraft and Scherer would argue that changes in ownership in the 1970s generally yielded improvements in efficiency because most of the transactions involved spin-offs of previously acquired and unrelated lines of business. According to this view a wave of unwarranted acquisitions in the 1960s led to disappointing performance and large numbers of sell-offs in the 1970s. We hope eventually to extend our sample through 1985; this would allow us to assess the impact of transactions occurring during the next lively phase of mergers and acquisitions activity.
Still, our findings concerning the determinants and effects of plant turnover imply that ownership change plays an important role in redeeming inefficient plants. In Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Albert Hirschman argued that some agents in an economic system may experience lapses from efficient or rational behavior. If the system functions smoothly, forces exist that will rectify this inefficient activity: No matter how well a society's basic institutions are devised, failures of some actors to live up to the behavior which is expected of them are bound to occur, if only for all kinds of accidental reasons. Each society learns to live with a certain amount of such dysfunctional or misbehavior; but lest the misbehavior feed on itself and lead to general decay, society must be able to marshal from within itself forces which will make as many of the faltering actors as possible revert to the behavior required for its proper functioning.35
Our evidence is consistent with the view that ownership change or asset redeployment is an important mechanism for correcting lapses from inefficient producer behavior. The gains realized by both target and acquiring shareholders appear to be social gains, not merely private ones. We found no evidence that ownership change is usually accompanied by the abrogation of implicit contracts with workers or suppliers. The often-cited productivity slowdown in the 1970s was reflected in our sample. The average TFP growth for all plants in the sample from 1974 to 1980 was -0.3 percent. Our evidence strongly suggested that this deterioration would have been more pronounced if ownership changes had not transpired. These results imply that policymakers should be extremely cautious when considering policies that would make ownership change more difficult or costly.
Our future work on this topic will attempt to study the nature of ownership changes that occur when plants are sold. For each transaction, we can identify the old and new parent companies. The LED file also contains information on each firm's operations in different industries in a given year. This information and the panel structure of the data will be used to identify different types of mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures. Economists and government officials are especially concerned with the effects of specific kinds of ownership change on efficiency. Analysis of distributions of efficiency gains by different methods of classifying such changes should broaden our understanding of mergers. In this regard, we will determine whether our findings are actually masking important differences in the pre-and postmerger performance of plants involved in the following types of transactions:
First and subsequent ownership change. Ownership change can be classified by whether it is the first, second, or so on transaction experienced by a given plant. Ravenscraft and Scherer's research suggested that, at least during the early 1970s, second ownership changes may have led to greater improvements in productivity than initial changes. If a firm acquires another entire firm, for example, it often purchases both desired and undesired lines of business. Therefore, spin-offs of previously acquired units may result in efficiency gains while the original acquisition may not.
Full and partial acquisitions. Whether an ownership change was part of a complete or partial corporate acquisition can also be determined. One might expect restructuring to lead to greater improvements in efficiency than acquisitions of entire firms.
Horizontal and nonhorizontal mergers. We can identify whether a firm purchasing a plant is entering a new industry or merely augmenting its industrywide activities. Because of their expertise in given lines of business, firms engaging in horizontal mergers may experience larger gains in productivity.
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-Friendly and hostile takeovers. It may also be possible to distinguish between friendly and hostile ownership changes. Policymakers are especially concerned about the economic effects of hostile takeovers. Opponents of these battles for corporate control view them as unnecessary, extravagant struggles that yield no social benefits. Further examination of Shleifer and Summers's hypothesis that hostile takeovers lead to breaches of implicit contracts with workers and suppliers will be pursued.
We have attributed the improvement in economic performance when plants change owners to an improved match between owner and establishment. In general, we believe these productivity gains result from more efficient management. However, we could not isolate the specific characteristics of new management, such as new technology or more effective leadership, that are directly responsible. Certainly a thorough analysis of management's contribution to better matches is vital.
From an analysis of case studies, Ravenscraft and Scherer reported that simplification of ownership structure improved the performance of lines of business.36 When lines were acquired through horizontal merger or were taken private by leveraged buyouts(or spin-offs), they generally experienced improved profitability. The authors attributed these results to reductions in company bureaucracy, renewed focus on more efficient operations, and other positive developments associated with their metamorphosis into independent entities. We can determine the effects on productivity of simpler ownership structure by using the Census Bureau data. The LED file indicates whether an owner also owns other plants. We can therefore determine when a multiunit establishment becomes a single-unit establishment. Leveraged buyouts of entire divisions can be determined from external data sources, and the effects on individual manufacturing plants within these divisions can be observed.
Finally, in future analyses of the determinants of ownership change, hazard function models with covariates will be devised and estimated to use the richness of our panel data. In our framework a hazard function will measure the probability that divestiture occurs within a predictable interval, given that a plant has remained with the same parent corporation until the beginning of the interval. Although our paramount objective will be to estimate the regression parameters, we are also interested in 36. Ravenscraft and Scherer, "Mergers and Managerial Performance." the properties of the hazard function. That is, we can determine whether the conditional probability of divestiture is strictly increasing, constant, or strictly decreasing as time goes on.
Appendix
To construct estimates of total factor productivity growth at the plant level based on three factors of production, there must be estimates of real values of output, Q; capital, K; labor, L; materials, including energy, M; and factor shares. The LED file provides data on nominal values of output, VQ; capital, VK; labor, VL; materials, VM; and changes in inventories. The construction of real Q, K, L, and M requires deflators. These deflators were imported from three separate files. In this appendix, we document the sources of our data and the methodology used to calculate TFP growth. Mergers and acquisitions have a cycle somewhat longer than the business cycle, but nonetheless there is a clear cycle. At the moment it has probably reached a peak. Maybe there will be fewer mergers and acquisitions, but certainly the last four or five years have witnessed a tremendous amount of activity. Table 1 in the paper shows a clear surge that began in 1981 and seems to have reached a frenzy in 1986. I do not know what the near future will bring, but activity will fall somewhat. Unfortunately 1981 is the last year for which the authors have data, so we will have to wait until the additional years have been added to the data set to examine this surge in activity.
Neoclassical economics has always had difficulty coping with mergers and acquisitions. First of all, if one takes the most naive view, they are uninteresting because they occur for reasons that economists do not need to investigate. A more sophisticated view would be that differences Obviously, people who have the more sanguine view of a particular economic enterprise-a firm, a plant, or whatever-will be able to pay more for it. They will bid it away from the people who have the less sanguine expectations, and they are not always going to be wrong.
By and large, such activities should result in improved economic performance. But in the literature on mergers and acquisitions, that is not the only result. There are in fact two kinds of results. Some studies make it obvious that people will take over or purchase a plant and will benefit from this ownership change. Other studies show something else going on, activities in which stockholders or others lose or people make mistakes. This paper is, obviously, in the former category, analyzing ownership changes that improve economic performance. The theoretical position of the authors might better be represented by a medical analogy than a labor market analogy. Plants, they argue, are like patients who get sick. Their performance deteriorates and they look for a physician. Some physicians (managers) are available within the firm itself, and they can be sent to deal with the problems; but they do not always succeed and may have to refer the patient to another manager. Plants thus keep looking until they find somebody who can make them well. Or they die. But as the authors note, the plants that did not survive are not included in the sample. So we only have those that got well.
The idea that a plant's deteriorating economic performance can be followed by a change of regime and an improvement in economic performance is well substantiated in the paper. It is an inspiring example of what one can get from the Longitudinal Establishment Data set, and the authors are to be complimented in their choice of an appropriate level of econometric sophistication.
The best results in the paper come from the simple exhibition of the data. Table 2 , for example, underscores the point that the LED exclude small plants, which are more labor-intensive, and new plants and plant closings. This constitutes an important handicap but one that cannot be dealt with very effectively here. Table 3 suggests that more ownership changes are associated with small plants, a suggestion that encourages speculation, but nothing more, about what would have happened if the study had been done for some of these small plants. So, obviously, from a methodological point of view the first priority is to find some way of dealing with this sample selection problem. Another conclusion I would draw from table 3 is that the assumption of constant returns to scale, which is made in all the productivity studies, is absolutely critical. The authors explicitly indicate that there is some support for the assumption, but it needs more corroborative testing to give it the backing necessary to substantiate their results.
The authors also show that ownership change has increased from 3 percent of plants in 1974 to 4 percent in 1981. Among the plants that changed ownership, more than half experienced more than one change between 1974 and 1980 (table 4). Here the medical analogy breaks down; many plants do not get well. Of all these sick patients, many first consulted a physician, found him unable to cure them, and went on to a second one. Table 5 shows that the plants that changed ownership are associated with low initial productivity, small size, or low initial employment. Table  6 , which begins to present the authors' results, shows that more than one ownership change is associated with higher initial productivity than is a single ownership change. In other words, the plants that changed hands more than once were, in some sense, healthier to begin with. Now, a footnote indicates that this difference is not significant, but it does deserve fuller exploration. Table 7 constitutes the heart of the empirical findings. Sick plants, it shows, get well, provided that they change owners. But in fact this is subject to some question: the sample involved here follows these plants from year seven before the year of initial change to year seven after the change. This is a constantly evolving sample. The plants in the sample changed ownership between 1973 and 1974. They thus represent only one year's data. If a different year is chosen-1972, say-one gets a different sample. This suggests that it is worth looking very carefully at the sample associated with each of these different findings. It could be just the evolution of the sample in some way. An observation that I will allude to later suggests something like this might be going on.
The authors note that an ownership change occurring late in the sample period has an insignificant effect in improving performance and that more than one ownership change has less effect than a single ownership change. Why? There does not seem to be very much of an explanation.
The authors test the hypothesis that there is simple regression toward the mean and conclude that cannot explain their results. They also test for errors and variables in the measurement of productivity, finding that bias is present and that it can to some extent be counteracted by using instrumental variables techniques. As one looks at total factor productivity in table 7 one sees differences in mean growth rates of output, input, and productivity between the changers and the nonchangers. (Keep in mind that the changers represent about 20 percent of the sample.) Interestingly, the so-called sick plantsthose that changed ownership-were getting well before the ownership change. In fact, they had about a half a per-centage point higher growth rate than the firms that did not change.
A macroeconomist of the Chicago school would have no problem with this at all. Plant managers could see ownership change approaching and were ready. They began shaping up so that when the new owners arrived, they would be able to retain their amenities and perquisites. After the ownership change, as table 7 shows, there is indeed some increase in annual productivity growth, at least for the first few years, and that does help close the gap. After four years or so, however, a relapse sets in. Then, in the seventh year, total factor productivity grows again. I do not take the numbers from years four through seven seriously. The authors obviously do not either. But the results for the years before the ownership change do seem to throw some cool, if not cold, water on the interpretation of the matching hypothesis.
Early in the paper the authors state that "ownership change is primarily a mechanism for correcting lapses of efficiency. Most acquisitions are precipitated by a deterioration in the target firm's economic performance. Deteriorating productivity provides an important signal to a plant's owner that for some reason he is operating in a less efficient manner than an alternative parent could." Well, whatever is going on in the data, it is not that these plants have experienced a deterioration, at least as measured by changes in total factor productivity, in their economic performance. Quite the contrary, they seem to have experienced a resurgence, albeit from a low initial level of economic performance. And that resurgence continues until the time the change in ownership occurs.
After the change, productivity accelerates for about three years and then drops. Rather than a signal that should lead to a maddening search for help, something else is going on.
My conclusion is not that there is some basic deficiency in the study. It presents extremely interesting empirical results that will stimulate all of us to look for ways to cope with classic problems of the response of economic performance to change in work rules or ownership or other situations. Exploitation of the LED set is an enterprise that deserves our wholehearted support. Edwin Mansfield: In this interesting paper, Frank Lichtenberg and Donald Siegel show that, for plants in the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Establishment Data file that survive from 1974 to 1980, the mean annual rate of productivity increase was higher for plants that changed owners than for those that did not. They also show that plants with relatively low initial (1973) productivity levels were more likely to be sold at least once between 1974 and 1980. They conclude that "Evidence pertaining to the determinants and effects of these transfers is consistent with the empirical implications of a matching theory of plant turnover. That is, a firm lacking a comparative advantage with respect to a given plant will sell it to another corporation, leading on average to an improvement in the plant's economic performance."
To begin with, one should note some possible biases in the authors' results because of their omission of plants that close. According to census data, in a five-year period about 30 percent of all plants close. The probability is particularly high among small and young plants. ' Of course, one reason plants close is that their productivity is too low to remain competitive. If this is a very important reason, the authors' finding that the mean annual rate of productivity increase was higher for sold than for unsold plants may be due in part to such a bias. Since, as the authors demonstrate, the level of productivity at the beginning of the period tends to be lower for plants that were sold than for those that were not sold, a plant that was sold would be more likely to go out of business if its productivity fell by a substantial percentage than would a plant that was not sold. Consequently, even if the probability distribution of the rate of productivity change each year were the same for sold and unsold plants (when all plants, not just survivors, are included), the average productivity increase would tend to be higher among sold than unsold surviving plants because, relative to all unsold plants, a larger proportion of all sold plants with significant percentage declines in productivity would close.
In columns 4 through 6 of table 6 the authors show that a plant's rate of productivity increase is inversely related to its initial level of productivity. As I indicated, this relationship may be due to biases resulting from the exclusion of plants that closed. The lower a plant's initial productivity level, the higher the probability that a significant decline in productivity will put it out of business. Thus the likelihood that plants with serious percentage decreases in productivity will be excluded from the analysis tends to be inversely related to their initial productivity level.
Even when the authors hold constant a plant's initial productivity level, as they do in table 6, there is no assurance that the observed difference between sold and unsold plants is not due in part to such biases. Whether the biases exist is impossible to say, based on the authors' paper, and it may be hard to obtain the data necessary to estimate their size because of difficulties in obtaining information on productivity changes among plants that have closed. Obviously, it would be worthwhile for the authors to do what they can to estimate these biases, even very roughly, since they bear directly on their central conclusion that "ownership change plays an important role in redeeming inefficient plants. " Turning to the matching theory of plant turnover, it is hard to square the theory with the authors' statistical results in table 7. According to them, a low level of productivity indicates a poor match and induces ownership change. Yet in table 7 it appears that plants sold in year t enjoyed a higher average rate of productivity increase than the unsold plants in the previous five years.2 Why then were the plants not sold five years before, when their productivity levels were lower relative to unsold plants than in year t? Part of the answer may lie in the lower rates of output growth of the sold plants between time t -5 and time t, but this suggests that the authors may have to include more variables than 2. While only one of these five figures is statistically significant, the probability that all five would be positive, given that there was no difference between sold and unsold plants in the average rate of productivity increase, would seem to be small. Certainly, there is no evidence that the average rate of productivity increase during this five-year period was lower among sold plants than among those unsold. There is thus a great opportunity for additional analysis of the reasons for the apparent increase in efficiency due to new management. As an illustration, consider the proposition put forth by some observers that American firms in recent years have tended to down-size plants and locate high-cost manufacturing activities abroad. To what extent is the apparently higher productivity due to a change in the range of manufacturing activities carried out by the plants that were sold? For example, to what extent is the higher efficiency due simply to their transferring certain activities to areas with lower wages rather than increasing the efficiency of the activities currently or previously being carried out? It would be useful to know the extent to which the apparently higher productivity was due not to improved methods but to a change in product and process mix resulting from the transfer of operations overseas.3
Br-ookings Papers oni Economnic
To explore these and other questions, the authors might carry out their analysis at a more disaggregated level. Given that their sample consists of more than 20,000 plants, they have the opportunity to analyze perhaps twenty major industries separately. One would expect the results to differ from industry to industry, and these differences should provide valuable clues concerning the reasons for the apparent increase in efficiency from new management. It would also be interesting to stratify the sample by firm size and to carry out the statistical analysis separately for large and small plants. This might allow rough judgments on the nature and size of the biases resulting from the fact that the plants in this sample are ten to twelve times as large (in terms of employment and output) as the typical manufacturing plant. Given this disparity in plant
